9 results for Aoki, Reiko

  • Indian Patent Policy and Public Health:Implications from the Japanese Experience

    Aoki, Reiko; Kubo, Kensuke; Yamane, Hiroko (2006)

    Working or discussion paper
    The University of Auckland Library

    The introduction of pharmaceutical product patents in India and other developing countries is expected to have a significant effect on public health and local pharmaceutical industries. This paper is an attempt to draw implications from the historical experience of Japan when it introduced product patents in 1976. In Japan, narrow patents and promotion of cross-licensing were effective tools to keep drug prices in check while ensuring the introduction of new drugs. Combined with a specially conceived health insurance scheme, this allowed the emergence of drugs for diseases that particularly affect the Japanese population. While the global pharmaceutical market surrounding India today differs considerably from that of the 1970's, the Japanese experience offers a policy option that may profitably be considered by India today. The Indian patent system emphasizes the patentability requirement in contrast to the Japanese patent policy which relied on narrow patents and extensive licensing. R & D by local firms and the development of local products may be promoted more effectively under the Japanese model.

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  • Oligopolisic Business-to-Business E-Market and Welfare

    Aoki, Reiko (2001)

    Working or discussion paper
    The University of Auckland Library

    We examine the effect of an oligopolistic upstream electronic market on upstream and downstream prices. The analysis highlights the two sources of competition that a firm that source from an electronic market (e-market firm) face: competition with less efficient firms that source traditionally (t-market firms) and competition among e-market firms. When size of the upstream e-market is small, the first effect dominates and there is higher profits with lower upstream prices in the e-market. When size of the emarket becomes very large, the second effect makes e-market firms less profitable than t-market firms even though e-market price may start to increase (as market size increases). As consequence, e-market will never completely eliminate the upstream t-market and downstream price can increase when e-market grows beyond a certain size.

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  • Public Disclosure of Patent Applications, R&D, and Welfare

    Aoki, Reiko; Spiegel, Yossi (1998)

    Working or discussion paper
    The University of Auckland Library

    In Europe and in Japan, patent applications are publicly disclosed after 18 month from the filing date regardless of whether a patent has been or will be registered. In the U.S. in contrast, patent applications are publicly disclosed only when a patent is granted. In this paper we examine the consequences of this difference for (i) firm's R&D and patenting behavior, (ii) consumers' surplus and social welfare, and (iii) the incentives of firms to innovate, in a setting where patent protection is imperfect in the sense that patent applications may be rejected and patents are not always upheld in court. The main conclusions are that public disclosure leads to fewer patent applications and fewer innovations, but for a given number of innovations, it raises the probability that new technologies will reach the product market and thereby enhances consumers' surplus and possibly total welfare as well .

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  • Patent Licensing with Spillovers

    Aoki, Reiko; Tauman, Yair (1998)

    Working or discussion paper
    The University of Auckland Library

    The purpose of this paper is to study the effect of spillover on extent of licensing when cost reducing innovation is introduced and licensed to a number of oligopolistic firms. We characterize the equilibrium number of licenses that are sold through an auction. An increase in the number of licenses has two effects. First, it increases the competition between the licensees. Second, due to spillover, the non-licensees become more efficient contributing to even more competition. We find that despite these effects, a patentee of a significant innovation will sell more licenses when there is spillover than without spillover thereby inducing even more competition. In this case, consumer surplus will be greater with spillover. However, if the innovation is less significant, then the patentee will sell less licenses with spillover thereby restrict competition. In this case the market price will be higher and the consumer surplus will be smaller.

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  • Cournot and Bertrand Competition with Vertical Quality Differentiation

    Aoki, Reiko (2001)

    Working or discussion paper
    The University of Auckland Library

    We consider a model of vertical quality differentiation. We show that in Coumot (quality setting) competition firm's profit is increasing in its own quality and decreasing in its rival's quality. This differs from the results for Bertrand (price setting) competition and conforms to some previously made assumptions concerning profit functions in a setting of vertical quality differentiation. However, even in this case, when an initial stage in which firms make as costly investment in quality is added, an asymmetric equilibrium results. This follows from the fact that in both types of competition, it is possible to improve profit by moving away (either by choosing higher or lower quality) from rival's quality. This paper is the same as manuscript dated 1988 of the same name.

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  • A Cooperative Game Approach to Patent Litigation, Settlement, and Allocation of Legal Costs

    Aoki, Reiko; Hu, Jin (1999)

    Working or discussion paper
    The University of Auckland Library

    We analyze litigation and settlement behavior in case of patent infringement using the Nash Bargaining Game framework. We show that litigation can be the Pareto efficient outcome. We also show that when there is settlement, the transfer payment from the defendant to the plaintiff is increasing in its own legal cost and decreasing in that of the plaintiff, reflecting the bargaining power on both sides. We also compare the American and English rules of cost allocation when legal costs are endogenously determined.

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  • Economics of Research Exemption

    Aoki, Reiko; Nagaoka, Sadao (2006)

    Working or discussion paper
    The University of Auckland Library

    We provide an economic analysis of two types of research exemptions: (1) experimentation and research on the patented subject matter, and (2) academic (or non-commercial) research with the patented invention. We find that exemption for research on improving or inventing-around the subject matter makes good economic sense in the context of perpetual R & D competition, although it may not in the context of pioneer-follower innovation framework. The best approach might be to provide broad research exemption on the research on subject matter (more generally exemption for research using the knowledge disclosed in the invention that is useful for improving its subject matter), while stronger protection is provided for a pioneering invention in the product market in terms of the breadth of claims. Exemption for experimentation on the subject matter for the purpose of verification of inventions also is sensible. On the other hand, we find that research exemption is a blunt tool for promoting academic research, with a negative effect on the development of research tool. In addition, it is not clear whether research exemption is necessary for efficient and coordinated price discrimination in favor of academic researches.

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  • Equilibrium Quality Choices with Generalized Smooth Cost Function

    Aoki, Reiko (2001)

    Working or discussion paper
    The University of Auckland Library

    We show that the effect of credible quality commitment on quality choice with Bertrand and Cournot competition in the product market for quadratic cost of quality function (Aoki (2000)) holds for more general cost functions. Specifically, we compare the quality choices with sequential and simultaneous quality choices when cost of quality q is kq n where k is a positive constant and n is any integer greater than 2. The first mover will always choose to produce higher quality, even when cost of quality increases very rapidly (n is large). All previously identifies qualitative comparisons between Bertrand and Cournot competition also extend to the generalized cost function.

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  • Compulsory Licensing of Technology and the Essential Facilities Doctrine

    Aoki, Reiko; Small, John (2002)

    Working or discussion paper
    The University of Auckland Library

    We look at compulsory licensing of intellectual property as remedy for anti-competitive practice. We identify aspects of intellectual property that warrants a different remedy from those using general definitions and remedies for essential facility. Based on the analysis, we present a characterisation of optimal compulsory licensing for a simple market.

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