85 results for Evans, Lewis, Scholarly text

  • Informed discussion: a benefit of partial privatisation of (electricity) SOEs

    Evans, Lewis (2012)

    Scholarly text
    Victoria University of Wellington

    Comment submitted to the NZ Herald by Lewis Evans in response to the Editorial comment of 11 January 2012.Informed discussion: a benefit of partial privatisation of (electricity) SOEs.

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  • Infrastructure Investment and Uncertainty

    Evans, Lewis (2010)

    Scholarly text
    Victoria University of Wellington

    Slides from the presentation by Professor Lewis Evans on Infrastructure Investment and Uncertainty, presented at the IIPS/Motu Workshop, victoria University on July 13, 2010.

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  • Climate and the New Zealand Electricity Spot Market

    Evans, Lewis (2010)

    Scholarly text
    Victoria University of Wellington

    Presentation by Lewis Evans at the Energy Roundtable Wellington on 8 September 2010.

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  • Informed discussion: a benefit of partial privatisation of (electricity) SOEs

    Evans, Lewis (2012)

    Scholarly text
    Victoria University of Wellington

    Comment submitted to the NZ Herald by Lewis Evans in response to the Editorial comment of 11 January 2012.Informed discussion: a benefit of partial privatisation of (electricity) SOEs.

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  • Options Provided by Storage can Explain High Electricity Prices

    Evans, Lewis; Counsell, Kevin; Guthrie, Graeme (2006)

    Scholarly text
    Victoria University of Wellington

    Generators supplying electricity markets are subject to volatile input and output prices and uncertain fuel availability. Price-risk may be hedged to a considerable extent but fuel-risk - water flows in the case of hydro and gas availability in the case of thermal plants - may not be. We show that a price-taking generator will only generate when the output price exceeds its marginal cost by an amount that reflects the value of the option to delay the use of stored fuel. The corresponding offer price is different from the theorized offer prices of static uniform auctions and more akin to pay-as-bid auction prices. We argue that the option value of delaying fuel use which is an increasing function of spot price volatility and the uncertainty about fuel availability must be considered when evaluating whether market power is present in electricity markets. The engineering approach to simulating an electricity supply curve which has been used in market power evaluations to date may lead to supply curves that are quite different from those that recognize possible fuel availability limitations even in the complete absence of market power.

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  • Using Regulation to Resolve Investment and Pricing Issues in Transmission: Round 1

    Evans, Lewis (2006)

    Scholarly text
    Victoria University of Wellington

    Lewis Evans presented Using Regulation to Resolve Investment and Pricing Issues in Transmission in Wellington in April 2006.

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  • Competition Law in Small Market Economies - Special Application to New Zealand Commentary

    Evans, Lewis; Arnold, Terence (2006)

    Scholarly text
    Victoria University of Wellington

    Slides by Lew Evans and Terence Lawrence presented Competition Law in Small Market Economies - Special Application to New Zealand Commentary at the Competition Law and Study Institute conference held in Wellington August 2006.

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  • Seminar: Protection of Private Property Rights & Just Compensation

    Quigley, Neil; Evans, Lewis (2009)

    Scholarly text
    Victoria University of Wellington

    Slide presentation for March seminar based on Monograph by Neil Quigley Lew Evans with Kevin Counsell (Feb 09) - Protection of Private Property Rights and Just Compensation.

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  • Application of Cost-Benefit Analysis Under Competition Law: The Gas Enquiry

    Evans, Lewis (2006)

    Scholarly text
    Victoria University of Wellington

    Lew Evans presented Application of Cost-Benefit Analysis Under Competition Law: The Gas Enquiry at the Competition Law and Study Institute conference in Wellington in August 2006.

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  • Forest and Forest Land Valuation: How to Value Forests and Forest Land to Include Carbon Costs and Benefits

    de Braganca, Gabriel Fiuza; Boyle, Glenn; Evans, Lewis (2008)

    Scholarly text
    Victoria University of Wellington

    New Zealand has introduced legislation to implement the world's first 'all sectors all gases' emissions trading scheme (ETS) as a way of reducing the country's greenhouse gas emissions. The Scheme is to retrospectively introduce a price for carbon emissions in forestry from 1 January 2008 and will phase in other sectors over time (notably agriculture from 2013). This report develops a methodology for valuing the impact of this change on forest and forest land value.

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  • Essays in Water Allocation: The Way Forward

    Evans, Lewis; Counsell, Kevin (2005)

    Scholarly text
    Victoria University of Wellington

    In this book we consider the tradeable property rights framework as a method of allocating water. Our objectives are to explain why such an approach can improve aspects of New Zealand's current water allocation framework to establish the appropriate set of institutional arrangements for a tradeable rights framework to operate effectively and to examine what may influence the value of tradeable water rights.

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  • Regulation of Lines Networks

    Quigley, Neil; Evans, Lewis (2003)

    Scholarly text
    Victoria University of Wellington

    Lew Evans and Neil Quigley presented, Regulation of Lines Networks at an ISCR half day seminar in March 2003.

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  • Sunk Investments, Regulation and the Cost of Capital

    Evans, Lewis; Guthrie, Graeme (2004)

    Scholarly text
    Victoria University of Wellington

    Professor Lewis Evans presented Sunk Investments, Regulation and the Cost of Capital at an ISCR Auckland seminar: Calculating the Cost of Capital: A Revisionists' Appraisal.

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  • Free Electricity: What Cost? – What Benefit?' by Lew Evans

    Evans, Lewis (2013)

    Scholarly text
    Victoria University of Wellington

    This Current Comment by Lew Evans is in response to the article by Susan Edmunds 'Call for free power', New Zealand Herald, 10 February 2013

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  • Alternating Currents or Counter-Revolution? Contemporary Electricity Reform in New Zealand, VUW Press 2005 , 1-346

    Evans, Lewis; Meade, Richard (2009)

    Scholarly text
    Victoria University of Wellington

    The authors place New Zealands current institutional arrangements for its electricity sector within the context of successive waves of economic reform. They compare these arrangements with developments internationally, drawing together lessons for future policymaking both in New Zealand and overseas. This book is a work of political economy that carefully analyses the interplay between technology, economics and politics that has at different times driven the sector. Controversially, the authors argue that the market reforms of the 1980s and 1990s provided greater supply security than the more centralised arrangements that prevailed in the past - and that New Zealands reversion to more centralised and political control since the late 1990s has resulted in an unsustainable half-way house that hinders private electricity investment and reinforces this trend. Themes of the book are: Does electricity sector liberalisation help politicians, power companies and consumers? Will central planning or market forces be more likely to ensure supply security? Is regulation or ownership the best way to protect consumers from electricity monopolies? Can electricity reforms succeed with centralised transmission planning? What can be learned from 20 years of electricity reform in New Zealand?

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  • Exchanging Price Information can be Efficient: per se offences should be legilsated very sparingly

    Evans, Lewis; Mellsop, James (2003)

    Scholarly text
    Victoria University of Wellington

    In this paper we draw upon relevant theory of auctions to show that information exchange among firms that leads to an agreed schedule of prices may not be price fixing and may enhance welfare. A case is described in which per se illegal communication among industry players that produced such agreements enhanced welfare. In the circumstances of the case communication substituted for information exchange that would have been provided by a forward market that was too costly to establish. The results are in accord with a growing body of literature that suggests that per se illegality under competition law should be used very sparingly.

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  • Asset Stranding is Inevitable: Implications for Optimal Regulatory Design

    Evans, Lewis; Guthrie, Graeme (2003)

    Scholarly text
    Victoria University of Wellington

    The irreversibility of much infrastructure investment means that some assets will stop earning revenue before the end of their physical lives; they will be stranded. Under traditional rate of return regulation firms are guaranteed the ability to recover the costs of investment insulating them from the consequences of asset stranding. Under modern incentive regulation firms are allowed to earn revenue just sufficient to cover the costs of a hypothetical efficient firm which provides services at minimum cost exposing them to the risk of asset stranding. By actively encouraging competition regulators increase this risk. We suggest two conditions applicable to both regimes which must be met if regulation is to be "reasonable": the regulated firm must not lose value from investment and it cannot collect more revenue than would the lowest cost alternative provider. This implies that regulated firms should be allowed to earn the riskless rate of return on the historical cost of their assets under rate of return regulation and a different (generally higher) rate of return on the replacement cost of their assets under incentive regulation. The risk premium depends on both the systematic and unsystematic risk of demand shocks. Since customers bear the risk of asset stranding under rate of return regulation and shareholders bear this risk under incentive regulation welfare is higher under incentive regulation as long as customers are more risk-averse than shareholders. We show that when there is a choice between reversible and irreversible technology there is no price specification under rate of return regulation that will induce the firm to choose the efficient bundle of technology while under incentive regulation the firm will choose the efficient mix of technologies. That is incentive regulation allocates the risk of asset stranding efficiently and also gives firms the incentive to reduce this risk to efficient levels. Finally incentive regulation has less demanding information requirements than traditional rate of return regulation.

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  • Accident Compensation: The Role of Incentive Consumer Choice and Competition

    Quigley, Neil; Evans, Lewis (2003)

    Scholarly text
    Victoria University of Wellington

    With the exception of the introduction of experience-rated premiums the incorporation of the term "insurance" in the title of the 1992 legislation and the short-lived reforms to the structure of workplace accident compensation in 1998 New Zealand's accident compensation scheme has continued to adhere to the principles laid down in the Woodhouse Report. In particular public monopoly provision comprehensive coverage and mandatory purchase separation from other segments of the market for personal risk (where private insurance companies operate) and cross-subsidies between different categories of insured risk were explicit components of Woodhouse's conception of the scheme. Retention of these aspects of the scheme has been justified by the claim that accident compensation is a component of the social welfare net rather than an insurance scheme and that the social welfare approach is superior from the point of view of those covered by the scheme.This paper reviews three of the economic issues raised by the structure of our accident compensation scheme: the role of incentives the relationship with the broader insurance market and the costs of government monopoly provision. We use our analysis of these issues to consider the veracity of the claim that potential accident victims in New Zealand benefit from our adherence to the principles laid out by the Woodhouse Report. We conclude that the current structure of our scheme creates perverse incentives that substantially reduce its efficiency while also denying those covered by the scheme the potential benefits that would come from consumer choice among competing providers offering a broader range of risk products.

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  • Protection of Private Property Rights and Just Compensation

    Quigley, Neil; Evans, Lewis; Counsell, Kevin (2009)

    Scholarly text
    Victoria University of Wellington

    In the last decade politicians from across the political spectrum have talked about 'transforming' New Zealand from an economy focused on land-based industries to an economy focused on investment in technology-based and high-value-added industries by promoting investment in and retaining New Zealand ownership of businesses developed in this country. In this paper we argue that New Zealand's current approach to the protection of property rights in particular protection from the state's taking of property rights without compensation runs contrary to this objective and to the more general objective of economic and social progress in New Zealand.

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  • An Essay on the Concept of Dynamic Efficiency and its Implications for Assessments of the Benefits from Regulation and Price Control

    Zhang, Jie; Quigley, Neil; Evans, Lewis (2000)

    Scholarly text
    Victoria University of Wellington

    Allocative and productive efficiency are static concepts in the sense that they relate to welfare at a point in time. Allocative and productive efficiency reflect the outcome at a single point in time of resource allocation and production decisions.

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