25 results for Quigley, Neil, Scholarly text

  • Seminar: Protection of Private Property Rights & Just Compensation

    Quigley, Neil; Evans, Lewis (2009)

    Scholarly text
    Victoria University of Wellington

    Slide presentation for March seminar based on Monograph by Neil Quigley Lew Evans with Kevin Counsell (Feb 09) - Protection of Private Property Rights and Just Compensation.

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  • Governance and Regulatory Decision-Making at the Commerce Commission

    Quigley, Neil (2005)

    Scholarly text
    Victoria University of Wellington

    Neil Quigley presented Governance and Regulatory Decision-Making at the Commerce Commission at the Contemporary Issues in Regulatory Theory and Practice half day workshop held in Wellington in March 2005.

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  • Calculating the Cost of Capital: Background Issues

    Quigley, Neil (2004)

    Scholarly text
    Victoria University of Wellington

    Slides by Professor Neil Quigley presented at the Auckland seminar Calculating the Cost of Capital: A Revisionists' Appraisal are available for download here.

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  • Regulation of Lines Networks

    Quigley, Neil; Evans, Lewis (2003)

    Scholarly text
    Victoria University of Wellington

    Lew Evans and Neil Quigley presented, Regulation of Lines Networks at an ISCR half day seminar in March 2003.

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  • Accident Compensation: The Role of Incentive Consumer Choice and Competition

    Quigley, Neil; Evans, Lewis (2003)

    Scholarly text
    Victoria University of Wellington

    With the exception of the introduction of experience-rated premiums the incorporation of the term "insurance" in the title of the 1992 legislation and the short-lived reforms to the structure of workplace accident compensation in 1998 New Zealand's accident compensation scheme has continued to adhere to the principles laid down in the Woodhouse Report. In particular public monopoly provision comprehensive coverage and mandatory purchase separation from other segments of the market for personal risk (where private insurance companies operate) and cross-subsidies between different categories of insured risk were explicit components of Woodhouse's conception of the scheme. Retention of these aspects of the scheme has been justified by the claim that accident compensation is a component of the social welfare net rather than an insurance scheme and that the social welfare approach is superior from the point of view of those covered by the scheme.This paper reviews three of the economic issues raised by the structure of our accident compensation scheme: the role of incentives the relationship with the broader insurance market and the costs of government monopoly provision. We use our analysis of these issues to consider the veracity of the claim that potential accident victims in New Zealand benefit from our adherence to the principles laid out by the Woodhouse Report. We conclude that the current structure of our scheme creates perverse incentives that substantially reduce its efficiency while also denying those covered by the scheme the potential benefits that would come from consumer choice among competing providers offering a broader range of risk products.

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  • Protection of Private Property Rights and Just Compensation

    Quigley, Neil; Evans, Lewis; Counsell, Kevin (2009)

    Scholarly text
    Victoria University of Wellington

    In the last decade politicians from across the political spectrum have talked about 'transforming' New Zealand from an economy focused on land-based industries to an economy focused on investment in technology-based and high-value-added industries by promoting investment in and retaining New Zealand ownership of businesses developed in this country. In this paper we argue that New Zealand's current approach to the protection of property rights in particular protection from the state's taking of property rights without compensation runs contrary to this objective and to the more general objective of economic and social progress in New Zealand.

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  • An Essay on the Concept of Dynamic Efficiency and its Implications for Assessments of the Benefits from Regulation and Price Control

    Zhang, Jie; Quigley, Neil; Evans, Lewis (2000)

    Scholarly text
    Victoria University of Wellington

    Allocative and productive efficiency are static concepts in the sense that they relate to welfare at a point in time. Allocative and productive efficiency reflect the outcome at a single point in time of resource allocation and production decisions.

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  • The Performance Based Research Fund and the Benefits of Competition Between Universities

    Quigley, Neil; Evans, Lewis (2006)

    Scholarly text
    Victoria University of Wellington

    Until the late 1980s competition between universities was limited and the allocation of funding by the University Grants Committee created a system that was more akin to central planning than to a competitive market. Following the advice of the Treasury the Labour government of the late 1980s and the National government of the early 1990s increasingly encouraged universities to compete for students. From 2000 onwards the Labour-led government began to question the value of competition between public institutions such as universities and to seek ways to minimise competitive duplication of courses and research programmes (Associate Minister of Education 2000; Watkin 2000). Despite the position of the Labour-led governments since 2000 competition between universities over 2000-06 has been perhaps more vigorous than it has ever been. This is because competition to attract students continues and a range of schemes such as Partnerships for Excellence Centres of Research Excellence and the Performance-Based Research Fund (PBRF) have encouraged universities to enter into vigorous competition for the limited funds available.2 The vigour of the competition is also a result of changes in the international environment. For all sectors including higher education both the level of competition and the opportunities for benefit have been increased by the declining cost of travel the improvement in standard of living of formerly low-income countries the growing importance of the service sector and the dramatic fall in the costs of communication including those relating to modes of learning.3 The government has actively promoted 'export education' as a strategy for the tertiary sector which has the effect of placing New Zealand tertiary institutions in direct competition with universities in Australia Canada the United States of America (US) the United Kingdom (UK) Europe and (increasingly) Singapore Hong Kong and Thailand. Even without export education the universities now need to compete with the best universities in Australia to retain the best domestic students in New Zealand let alone attract students from other countries.

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  • The Interaction Between Contract and Competition Law

    Quigley, Neil; Evans, Lewis (2002)

    Scholarly text
    Victoria University of Wellington

    This paper provides some economic perspectives on the interaction between contract law and competition (antitrust) law. First it surveys some relevant aspects of the literature and provides some specific examples relating to:(i) The theory and development of contract enforcement institutions(ii) Vertical contractual relationships between firms at different levels in the production and supply chain; and (iii) The role of contracts in enabling specialised investments to take place by limiting opportunism spreading risks and assigning property rights.Second it considers the lessons that developing countries may draw from this literature as they consider the sequencing of reforms relating to contract and competition law and the economic implications of the commitment of resources to developing Western-style legal frameworks in each area of law. Most contractual relationships raise questions about the balance between the efficiency gains from ex ante specification of rights and entitlements and the potential reduction in social welfare that may come from the exclusion of other parties from the relationship and the resources committed to it. By focusing only on the detriment side of the welfare ledger especially where the resources committed or the market shares of the contracting parties are large in the context of the relevant markets enforcement of competition law may sometimes reduce welfare by overturning or undermining contracts that have large efficiency benefits but nonetheless may have some lesser anti-competitive detriment. Further setting aside contracts on anti-competitive grounds that have been on foot for a significant term due to changed circumstances that were unforeseen at the time of contracting imposes external costs on the wider economy.

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  • Competitive and Centrally Planned Decision Making in the Electricity Industry

    Quigley, Neil; Evans, Lewis (2003)

    Scholarly text
    Victoria University of Wellington

    This supplement was published in May of 2003 and discusses: The Electricity IndustryPrices in the Electricity MarketCentral planning applied to electricity

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  • The Economics of Harmonisation: Implications for Reform of Commercial Law and Regulation in New Zealand

    Quigley, Neil (2003)

    Scholarly text
    Victoria University of Wellington

    This paper provides an economic assessment of the costs and benefits of harmonising New Zealand's commercial laws and regulations with those in Australia or with an OECD norm. It argues that unless the definition of harmonisation is limited to mutual recognition the economics literature surveyed does not support a general presumption in favour of harmonisation of commercial laws.The absence of any presumption in favour of harmonisation is based on the infeasibility of full harmonisation while New Zealand maintains political independence and on the overall requirement for an assessment of the efficiency of any law in the context of the New Zealand economy

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  • Common Elements in the Governance of Deregulated Electricity Markets, Telecommunications Market and Payment Systems

    Quigley, Neil; Evans, Lewis (1998)

    Scholarly text
    Victoria University of Wellington

    We use the telecommunications industry and electricity market in New Zealand and payments systems in Canada and New Zealand to examine the implications of modern network technology for the organisation and governance of deregulated markets. Our analysis identifies natural monopoly components of networks as the key issue for the governance of these markets. We show how technological change has enhanced the scope for competition and reduced the desirability of public management and regulation in network industries. We argue that where natural monopoly or other problems persist private joint ventures are superior to public sector monopoly as a means of organising the activity. Light-handed regulation in which markets are constrained only by economy-wide competition law provides for the development of efficient private solutions to the special governance problems of network industries.

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  • Local Body Rating of the Distribution Networks of Utility Companies: An Economic Analysis

    Quigley, Neil; Evans, Lewis (2001)

    Scholarly text
    Victoria University of Wellington

    Our analysis is concerned solely with the levy of rates on the value of the distribution networks of utilities (which may be on poles above ground or underground) and is not applicable to the land and buildings owned by utilities and rated under the standard residential and commercial rating schemes. We consider two key questions: Is it efficient for utilities to be rated on the value of their distributionnetworks? and Does rating on the basis of the value of distribution networks provide utility companies with incentives that are consistent with New Zealand governmentpolicy?

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  • Thresholds for the Scrutiny of Mergers and the Problem of Joint Dominance

    Quigley, Neil; Evans, Lewis; Hughes, Patrick (1999)

    Scholarly text
    Victoria University of Wellington

    In this Report we consider:1. How the potential for tacit and explicit collusion associated with joint dominance can best be assessed in merger applications.2. Whether the inclusion in section 47 of the Commerce Act of the competition test proposed above in place of the existing dominance test will provide an efficient and effective means of identifying markets where tacit collusion is likely to result from joint dominance.3. Whether the evidence from Canada and the USA (where a substantial lessening of competition test is applied to mergers) supports the claim that the test proposed by the Ministry of Commerce is superior to one of pure dominance in respect of identifying joint dominance (oligopoly) problems.

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  • An Analysis of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand's Policy on the Incorporation of Foreign Banks

    Quigley, Neil; Evans, Lewis (2002)

    Scholarly text
    Victoria University of Wellington

    In this study we analyse the objectives underlying the Reserve Bank's policy ofmandatory local incorporation and provide an assessment of the effectiveness of the policy in meeting these objectives. We review both the legal and regulatory framework within which branches of foreign banks now operate in New Zealand and we review the international literature on the costs benefits and efficiency tradeoffs associated with a policy of mandatory local incorporation. We consider the consistency of mandatory local incorporation with the Reserve Bank's current approach to the regulation of financial institutions and we show that the governance structure that is imposed on New Zealand banks by mandatory local incorporation is likely to reduce the efficiency of their operations. Finally we examine a number of approaches that may meet the current concerns of the RBNZ at lower cost than a policy of mandatory local incorporation.

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  • Contracting, Incentives for Breach, and the Impact of Competition

    Quigley, Neil; Evans, Lewis (1999)

    Scholarly text
    Victoria University of Wellington

    In this paper we provide an economic perspective on the application of competition law to contracts.

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  • Incomplete Contracts: Implications for the Organisation of the Public Sector' presented by Neil Quigley 6 Sept 2012.

    Quigley, Neil; Evans, Lewis; Guthrie, Graeme (2012)

    Scholarly text
    Victoria University of Wellington

    This paper was presented at the ISCR seminar 6 September 2012 by Professor Neil Quigley.

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  • Agency Contracts with Long-Term Customer Relationships

    Quigley, Neil; Hortsmann, Ignatius; Mathewson, Frank (2005)

    Scholarly text
    Victoria University of Wellington

    In certain types of industries contracts for sales agents include both commission payments for sales and clawbacks of these payments if existing clients are not retained. This paper provides a model that shows that contracts with these features arise in equilibrium in environments having: i) up-front selling costs that are re-couped from on-going sales ii) heterogeneous customers iii) limited sales agent access to capital markets and iv) imperfect commitment by customers and agents to long-term contracts. We test the model using information on insurance sales agent contracts in New Zealand prior to and after bank entry into the insurance sales market. Increased policy lapse rates for traditional insurances post bank entry indicate that banks were cream-skimming customers. Our model predicts that in this case bank entry should reduce the value of both initial commissions paid for sales and the clawback for policy lapses. The data support this prediction.

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  • Watershed for New Zealand Dairy industry

    Quigley, Neil; Evans, Lewis (2001)

    Scholarly text
    Victoria University of Wellington

    Number 1 in the monograph series by ISCR. This issue published in July of 2001 has the following articles: Down on the farm is going global Can a large single Co-operative be efficient?The price of milk and the value of capitalThe discipline of open entry and exitWhat does open entry and exit from global dairy mean?Capital structure and co-operative ownershipA market is bornRegulating global dairyThe market for genetic information in the dairy industryDoes the New Zealand dairy industry have market power in foreign markets?Global dairy and competition lawRequiem for the dairy board

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  • Estimating Implied Valuation Parameters: Extension and Application to Ground Lease Rentals

    Quigley, Neil; Boyle, Glenn; Guthrie, Graeme (2008)

    Scholarly text
    Victoria University of Wellington

    A problem that often arises in applied finance is one where decision-makers need to choose a value for some parameter that will affect the cash flows between two parties such as a rental rate or an exercise price. Because the values of the cash flows also depend on various unobservable parameters identifying the value of the policy parameter that achieves the desired allocation between the parties is no simple task often resulting in disputes and the invocation of ad-hoc approaches. We show how this problem can be solved using an extension of the well-known 'implied volatility' technique from option pricing and apply it to the determination of equilibrium rental rates on ground leases of commercial land.

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