3 results for Fielding, David, Working or discussion paper, 2015

  • Copyright Payments in Eighteenth-Century Britain, 1701–1800

    Fielding, David; Rogers, Shef (2015-06)

    Working or discussion paper
    University of Otago

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  • Understanding the Etiology of Electoral Violence: The Case of Zimbabwe

    Fielding, David (2015-06)

    Working or discussion paper
    University of Otago

    Recent theoretical and empirical work indicates that incumbent governments are likely to attempt to influence election outcomes by violent means (rather than by bribery and fraud) when their level of popular support is relatively low. However, evidence also suggests that in some countries electoral violence can be quite easy to thwart through peaceful means. This may seem surprising when the incumbent has control over an extensive and well-equipped state security apparatus. The analysis of Zimbabwean data in this paper suggests an explanation: the incumbent prefers to avoid the direct involvement of the state security apparatus when intimidating voters (perhaps because such involvement would undermine the incumbent’s legitimacy abroad), and relies instead on informal groups with very limited organizational capacity. One consequence in Zimbabwe is that the intimidation is heavily focused in places where the incumbent is relatively popular, ceteris paribus.

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  • Credit Booms, Financial Fragility and Banking Crises

    Fielding, David; Rewilak, Johan (2015-08)

    Working or discussion paper
    University of Otago

    Recent evidence indicates that surges in capital inflows and credit booms can increase the probability of a subsequent banking crisis. Using a new country-level panel database on financial fragility, we take this analysis further by exploring the interaction of surges, booms and fragility. We find that booms and fragility are both important, but booms increase the probability of a crisis only in financial systems with a relatively high level of fragility. Booms appear not to be dangerous in countries with a robust banking system.

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