451 results for Scholarly text, 2010

  • The proposed Fairfax-NZME merger and its implications for democracy: What the merger reveals about New Zealand's legal commitment to protecting the constitutional role of new media

    Ginders, Kasia (2010)

    Scholarly text
    Victoria University of Wellington

    The Commerce Commission is currently reviewing the proposed merger of Fairfax NZ Limited and NZME, which would see nearly 90% of New Zealand’s newspaper market held by a single company. However, it is unclear that the review process is designed to ensure that any changes in media ownership result in the right kind of important public consequences: the preservation of the constitutional role of the media. In this paper I seek to analyse what the merger process reveals about New Zealand’s legal commitment to protecting the public role of journalism. Ultimately, I conclude that there is a failure to promote diversity in the news media and ensure the right kind of consequence – a thriving democracy.

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  • Three strikes and preventive detention : do we really need them both?

    Georgiou, Robert. (2010)

    Scholarly text
    Victoria University of Wellington

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  • Clarifying the charitable status of amateur sport in the Charities Act 2005

    Florian, Christoph, 1983- (2010)

    Scholarly text
    Victoria University of Wellington

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  • The "three strikes law" in New Zealand

    Diefenbach, Nina. (2010)

    Scholarly text
    Victoria University of Wellington

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  • The regulation of credit rating agencies in New Zealand : from a public law perspective : a necessity to step in to regulate?

    Pietschmann, Thomas. (2010)

    Scholarly text
    Victoria University of Wellington

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  • Internet New Zealand Ultrafast Broadband Workshop

    Heatley, David; Howell, Bronwyn (2010)

    Scholarly text
    Victoria University of Wellington

    Bronwyn Howell and Dave Heatley's presentation at the recent Internet New Zealand Ultrafast Broadband Workshop held in Wellington on 19 May 2010.

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  • Reflections on the Report by the Tax Working Group presented by Professor John Creedy

    Creedy, John (2010)

    Scholarly text
    Victoria University of Wellington

    Professor John Creedy presents his reflections on the Tax Working Group Report (Report available here.) John presents his findings to a Wellington audience on Tuesday 23 February and in Auckland on Thursday 25 February.

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  • Structural Separation and Prospects for Welfare-Enhancing Price Discrimination in a New 'Natural Monopoly' Network: comparing fibre broadband proposals in Australia and New Zealand

    Heatley, David; Howell, Bronwyn (2010)

    Scholarly text
    Victoria University of Wellington

    The Australian and New Zealand governments have both decided that substantial government investment is required to accelerate the deployment of new nationwide fibre-to-the-home (FTTH) networks. This paper examines the two proposals in light of the crucial role of price discrimination in enabling rapid and early uptake of a new technology with a natural monopoly cost structure given the assumptions that both networks will be subject to provisions that separate elements of network ownership from retail operations and both will face competition from other (vertically integrated) network technologies. Whilst price discrimination enables a monopolist to maximise profits by extracting surplus from consumers when the firm has a natural monopoly cost structure it also enables the firm to increase welfare by accessing scale economies (static efficiency gains) and to introduce the technology earlier than under the counterfactual of a single price (dynamic efficiency gains). However vertical separation of network and retail functions and regulated 'open access' and 'equivalence' requirements used as regulatory tools to increase retail competition and constrain price and non-price discrimination by monopoly network operators restricts the ability of a new network operator to use its price structure to introduce the technology in a timely manner and to gain access to welfare-enhancing scale economies. In a competitive environment when the new (frontier) network must build its customer base principally from the substitution of customers from the existing (legacy) natural monopoly networks (which may be vertically integrated and engaging in price discrimination themselves) the non-discriminatory provisions of structural separation impose substantial limitations upon the regulated firm's business case. Both the Australian and New Zealand FTTH proposal impose separation and non-discrimination requirements as a precondition for government financing although they differ in their approaches in respect of both the point at which the separation must be enforced and the extent of competition anticipated from existing network operators. Whilst neither proposal enables the full efficiency gains available from producing at maximum efficient scale to be realised the Australian proposal with integration of layer 1 and 2 operators and acquisition of the competing copper access networks appears to offer efficiency and substitution advantages over the New Zealand proposal which requires separation between layer 1 and 2 operators and provides no clear view of the competitive positioning of the FTTH network relative to the legacy copper access rival.

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  • A Theoretical Analysis of Special Safeguards (SSG)

    Stiegert, Kyle (2010)

    Scholarly text
    Victoria University of Wellington

    Special safeguards (SSG) sanctioned tariffs that are triggered when a minimum import level is reached emerged as part of the unique and complex WTO Agreement of Agriculture (AA). Unlike more conventional safeguard measures such as antidumping SSGs do not require proof of injury compensation or consultations with relevant countries. The special safeguard was initiated as an outcropping of the hard law process aimed to mediate an impact of tariffication. This presenation considers the policy impacts of SSGs in the presence of large multinational firms with oligopoly power. We show the conditions by which firms endogenously limit imports to avoid triggering the tariff and when they will not. Models with a domestic industry and with commodity storage option are considered.

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  • Can spot market power translate into market power in the hedge market?

    de Braganca, Gabriel Fiuza (2010)

    Scholarly text
    Victoria University of Wellington

    Gabriel Fiuza de Braganca slide presentation to the WEAI 85th Annual Conference held 1 July 2010 in Portland Oregon USA.

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  • The efficiency of collusion and criminal sanctions in New Zealand

    Evans, Lewis (2010)

    Scholarly text
    Victoria University of Wellington

    On January 27 the Justice Minister released a discussion document proposing to criminalise cartel activities such as price fixing and bid rigging. In this seminar Professor Evans will consider efficiency aspects of the Minister's proposal in particular the efficiencies which can arise when competing business cooperate and the difficulties officials can have in separting beneficial and harmful cooperation.

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  • Flat-rate Tariffs and Competitive Entry in Telecommunications Markets

    Howell, Bronwyn (2010)

    Scholarly text
    Victoria University of Wellington

    Presentation by Bronwyn Howell to the 18th Biennial conference of the International Telecommunications Society Tokyo Japan 27-30 June 2010.

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  • UFBI 2.0: Revised separation boundaries may partially address pricing and uptake limitations in New Zealand fibre broadband model, but significant competition policy problems remain

    Heatley, David; Howell, Bronwyn (2010)

    Scholarly text
    Victoria University of Wellington

    On July 1 2010 the Minister of Communications Steven Joyce announced fundamental changes to the structure and regulation of the New Zealand Government's Ultra-Fast Broadband Initiative. The changes were deemed necessary in order to achieve uptake targets sufficient to underpin the business case for both government and private sector investment. Whilst the changes would appear to enable progress towards the ability to access productive scale efficiencies and competitive pricing structures that will induce some degree of substitution lack of clarity about the future competitive environment still exposes investors in the sector to significant uncertainties and potential perverse outcomes. Consequently overall sector investment will likely be inhibited and the evolution of broadband sector institutions substantially constrained.

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  • Feeding a need for speed or Funding a Fibre 'Arms Race'?

    Grimes, Arthur; Howell, Bronwyn (2010)

    Scholarly text
    Victoria University of Wellington

    Fast internet access is widely considered to be a productivity-enhancing factor. However despite promises of substantial gains from its deployment the evidence from recent empirical studies sugests that the productivity gains may not be as large as originally hypothesised. If substantiated these findings suggest that current government plans to apply significant sums to bring forward the deployment of fast fibre networks (e.g. in both Australia and New Zealand) may ultimately be unlikely to generate returns to the extent anticipated by their sponsors.Drawing upon the critical literature generated when the original 'computer productivity paradox' called into question why investment in ICTs was apparently failing to generate anticipated productivity returns this paper develops a critical questioning framework to assist policy-makers in identifying the salient productivity issues to be addressed when making the decision to apply scarce public resources to faster broadband network deployment. Using multiple literatures the framework highlights the nuanced and highly complex ways in which broadband network speed may affect productivity both positively and negatively. Policy-makers need to be satisfied that on balance government-funded investments in faster networks will likely generate the anticipated net benefits given the significant uncertainties that are identified in the questioning framework.

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  • Flat-Rate Tariffs and Competitive Entry in Telecommunications Markets

    Howell, Bronwyn (2010)

    Scholarly text
    Victoria University of Wellington

    Flat-rate tariffs have become widespread in the sale of broadband services. Although popular amongst network operators consumers and policy-makers flat-rate tariffs have been implicated in retarding the rate of substitution from legacy to frontier technologies and distorting competitive entry incentives by imposing a disjunction between the prices charged for and the costs of providing services. Flat-rate tariffs impose mandatory wealth transfers between classes of consumers in a similar manner to universal (equalised) pricing obligations. Low-volume consumers are required to subsidise high-volume users thereby depressing the rate at which the flat-rated product diffuses relative to one with a tariff that separates the bundle of connection to the network and usage of it. The tariff also induces entry by higher-cost providers when this is not overall efficiency-raising as long as the entrant can selectively attract only low-volume users (e.g. with a two-part tariff or via selective bundling). Whilst in theory the entry distortions can be corrected with taxes in practice this has proved extremely problematic as it necessitates detecting the degree of adverse selection engaged in and accurately assessing its costs. Flat-rate tariffs are also unlikely to prevail in the long-run in competitive markets where individual consumer usage volumes vary substantially because there is always an incentive for a provider to offer a two-part tariff to selectively attract low-volume consumers. They are likely to prevail only when supported by regulation or collective provider market power but with attendant welfare consequences. Telecommunications policy-makers should therefore exercise some caution before recommending that such tariffs become widely adopted.

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  • A development agenda, the donor dollar and voluntary failure

    Cordery, Carolyn; Baskerville, Rachel; Sutton, David (2010)

    Scholarly text
    Victoria University of Wellington

    This paper examines the success and failure of a once pre-eminent New Zealand charity - the Council of Organisations for Relief Service Overseas (CORSO). Delivering aid for government was a factor in its success in its early years as was its broad membership base. Voluntary failure occurred when CORSO lost government support. It also lost donor support when international charities established a competitive donor 'market'. Its supporters' unwillingness to 'buy-in' to its mission change to focus on local poverty was another factor in its collapse. This case study employs a framework which extends Salamon's (1987) to consider the influence of competition on voluntary failure.

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  • Lattice methods for no-arbitrage pricing of interest rate securities

    Daglish, Toby (2010)

    Scholarly text
    Victoria University of Wellington

    We explore calibration of single factor no-arbitrage short rate models to yield and volatility information. We note that the calculation of Arrow-Debreu prices for interest rate securities is analogous to solving the Kolmogorov Forward Equation. This insight allows us to implement implicit methods which exhibit more rapid convergence than explicit methods. We develop an algorithm for calibrating a model to match both yield and volatility curves which is general across single factor short rate models and also across finite difference techniques. Numerical examples confirm that our approach vastly improves computation times for derivative pricing.

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  • Wolves in the Hen-House? The Consequences of Formal CEO Involvement in the Executive Pay-Setting Process

    Boyle, Glenn; Roberts, Helen (2010)

    Scholarly text
    Victoria University of Wellington

    New Zealand firms exhibit significant variation in the extent to which they formally involve CEOs in the executive pay-setting process: a considerable number sit on the compensation committee while others are excluded from the board altogether. Using 1997-2005 data we find that CEOs who sit on the compensation committee obtain generous annual pay rewards that have low sensitivity to poor performance shocks. By contrast CEOs who are not board members receive pay increments that have low mean and high sensitivity to firm performance. Moreover the greater the pay increment attributable to CEO involvement in the pay-setting process the weaker is subsequent firm performance over one three- and five-year periods.

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  • Current Comment: Will Abolishing the Telecommunications Service Order Compensation End Universal Service pricing in New Zealand?

    Heatley, David; Howell, Bronwyn (2010)

    Scholarly text
    Victoria University of Wellington

    Current Comment is an occasional series providing economic commentary on topical issues.

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  • Vertically Integrated Electricity Generators - Villains, Victims or Heroes?

    Meade, Richard (2010)

    Scholarly text
    Victoria University of Wellington

    Given the market power of electricity generators should they be allowed to own electricity retailers - i.e. to vertically integrate - or should vertical separation from retailers be required? How does vertical integration change the operation of forward contract spot wholesale and retail markets? If generators themselves choose to be vertically integrated doesn't that mean consumers will suffer? Richard Meade presents his recently completed Masters thesis from the Toulouse School of Economics in which he develops a formal model to address these questions. His previous work suggests there are benefits to vertical integration - his latest modelling demonstrates that VI is clearly superior in welfare terms to vertical separation. This remains true even though vertically-integrated generators can engage in apparently anti-competitive behaviour. Indeed generators may need to integrate in order to protect themselves against the countervailing behaviours of retailers.

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